PEARL HARBOR RADAR – *** Here’s an anecdote from my WWII page. On the morning of Dec. 7, 1941, Privates Joseph Lockard and George Elliott were operating an experimental radar station near Pearl Harbor. They were off duty at 7 A.M., but since their ride had not arrived, Elliott was still fooling around with the radar. At 7:02, a large blip appeared on the screen. The two attempted to contact the control room at the base, but there was no answer. They got in contact with the only person on duty, Lt. Kermit Tyler. When he was told about the ominous blip, he told them not to worry. A flight of B-17s were due in from California, so it must be them, although the blip was much bigger than that. Lockard and Elliott were picked up at 7:45, the first bombs fell at 7:55. Whitcomb p. 295
Categories: Anecdote
2 Comments
K. G Liao · December 20, 2019 at 4:17 pm
There were two critical factors that still undermined the scenario that the RADAR detection of the Japanese aircraft before 0800 hours COULD have changed the reaction of the American military at Pearl Harbor or otherwise minimized this disaster.
This particular site of the new Aircraft Warning System (AWS) had been moved to Opana Point (from Schofield Barracks) on the “North Shore” around Thanksgiving (and was not “near” Pearl Harbor but on the other side of Oahu).
In the early morning of 07-December-1941, Lt. Kermit Tyler had the “early” duty shift at Fort Shafter. He drove an hour from his barracks at Bellows, and turned on his radio. He could hear music from one of the local stations. What this meant that there were aircraft arriving from the (US) Mainland – radio music after midnight indicated such a mission was expected. Tyler checked-in and confirmed that 1 flight of B-17s were flying i(I think a total of half-dozen planes).
Factor (1): the flight path of the Japanese attack airplanes chose was nearly identical to the expected one of the B-17s. the B-17s were heading for Hawaii from the north – same as the IJN attack planes., separated by time, of course. The variance between their respective “headings” (relative to true north) was a matter of a few degrees.
This was a deadly coincidence. Confirmation bias?
Factor (2) Lack of Interrogatives. When Lockard and Elliott kept trying to verify what they were seeing on the AWS scope, they were unable to talk to Tyler directly at first. They were simply informed ‘not to worry”. When they did reach Tyler, he simply repeated his information about the B-17s, without questioning these privates.
If Lockard/Ellicott has simply asked how many B-17s were expected, or if Tyler had inquired directly about what the signalmen were actually seeing and why they were concerned, the impact of the Pearl Harbor attack might have been mitigated a bit. (What is military intelligence?)
admin · December 22, 2019 at 5:32 pm
Thanks for being the first person to comment on this website. And for adding such fascinating information. I greatly appreciate it.